Abstract. We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length. We go on to give an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds are about mq 2 /2 n for the basic CBC MAC and m o(1) q 2 /2 n for the encrypted CBC MAC, improving prior bounds of m 2 q 2 /2 n . The new bounds translate into improved guarantees on the probability of forging these MACs.
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Introduction
Some definitions. The CBC function CBC π associated to a key π: {0, 1} n → {0, 1}
n takes as input a message M = M 1 · · · M m that is a sequence of n-bit blocks and returns the n-bit string C m computed by setting C i = π(C i−1 ⊕ M i ) for each i ∈ [1..m], where C 0 = 0 n . Consider three types of attacks for an adversary given an oracle: atk = eq means all queries are exactly m blocks long; atk = pf means they have at most m blocks and no query is a prefix of any another; atk = any means the queries are arbitrary distinct strings of at most m blocks. Let Adv is actually a little stronger. See Fig. 1 .) This implies the same bound holds for Adv eq CBC (q, n, m).
Context and discussion. When π = E(K, ·), where K ∈ K is a random key for blockcipher E: K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the function CBC π is a popular message authentication code (MAC). Assuming E is a good pseudorandom permutation (PRP), the dominant term in a bound on the probability of forgery in an atk-type chosen-message attack is Adv atk CBC (q, n, m), where q is the sum of the number of MAC-generation and MAC-verification queries made by the adversary (cf. [1] ). Thus the quality of guarantee we get on the security of the MAC is a function of how good an upper bound we can prove on Adv atk CBC (q, n, m). It is well known that the CBC MAC is insecure when the messages MACed have varying lengths (specifically, it is forgeable under an any-attack that uses just one MAC-generation and one MAC-verification query, each of at most two blocks) so the case atk = any is not of interest for CBC. The case where all messages MACed have the same length (atk = eq) is the most basic one, and where positive results were first obtained [2] . The case atk = pf is interesting because one way to get a secure MAC for varying-length inputs is to apply a prefix-free encoding to the data before MACing it. The most common such encoding is to include in the first block of each message an encoding of its length.
We emphasize that our results are about CBC π for a random permutation π: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and not about CBC ρ for a random function ρ: {0, 1} n → {0, 1}
n . Since our bounds are better than the cost to convert between a random n-bit function and a random n-bit permutation using the switching lemma [2] , the distinction is significant. Indeed for the prefix-free case, applying CBC over a random function on n bits is known to admit an attack more effective than that which is ruled out by our bound [6] .
Encrypted CBC. The ECBC function ECBC π1,π2 associated to permutations π 1 , π 2 on n bits takes a message M that is a multiple of n bits and returns π 2 (CBC π1 (M )). Define Adv atk ECBC (q, n, m) analogously to the CBC case above (atk ∈ {any, eq, pf}). Petrank and Rackoff [15] showed that Adv
) for some constant c, is possible for the atk = eq case based on a lemma of Dodis et al. [9] , but the point of the ECBC construction is to achieve any-security. We improve on the result of Petrank and Rackoff to show that Adv The MAC corresponding to ECBC (namely ECBC π1,π2 when π 1 = E(K 1 , ·) and π 2 = E(K 2 , ·) for random keys K 1 , K 2 ∈ K of a blockcipher E: K×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ) was developed by the RACE project [5] . This MAC is interesting as a natural and practical variant of the CBC MAC that correctly handles messages of varying lengths. A variant of ECBC called CMAC was recently adopted as a NIST-recommended mode of operation [14] . As with the CBC MAC, our results imply improved guarantees on the forgery probability of the ECBC MAC under a chosen-message attack, but this time of type any rather than merely pf, and with the improvement being numerically more substantial.
More definitions. The collision-probability CP atk n,m of the CBC MAC is the maximum, over all pairs of messages (M 1 , M 2 ) in an appropriate atk-dependent range, of the probability, over random π, that CBC π (M 1 ) = CBC π (M 2 ). For atk = any the range is any pair of distinct strings of length a positive multiple of n but at most mn; for atk = pf it is any such pair where neither string is a prefix of the other; and for atk = eq it is any pair of distinct strings of exactly mn bits. The full collision probability FCP atk n,m is similar except that the probability is of the event C n . Note that these definitions do not involve an adversary and in this sense are simpler than the advantage functions considered above.
Reductions to FCP and CP. By viewing ECBC as an instance of the Carter-Wegman paradigm [18] , one can reduce bounding Adv atk ECBC (q, n, m) (for atk ∈ {any, eq, pf}) to bounding CP atk n,m (see [7] , stated here as Lemma 3). This simplifies the analysis because one is now faced with a combinatorial problem rather than consideration of a dynamic, adaptive adversary.
The first step in our analysis of the CBC MAC is to provide an analogous reduction (Lemma 1) that reduces bounding Adv pf CBC (q, n, m) to bounding FCP pf n,m . Unlike the case of ECBC, the reduction is not immediate and does not rely on the Carter-Wegman paradigm. Rather it is proved directly using the game-playing approach [4, 16] .
Bounds on FCP and CP. Black and Rogaway [7] show that CP any n,m ≤ 2(m 2 + m)/2 n . Dodis, Gennaro, Håstad, Krawczyk, and Rabin [9] show that CP Our bound on Adv pf CBC (q, n, m) then follows. We remark that the security proof of RMAC [11] had stated and used a claim that implies CP any n,m ≤ 12m/2 n , but the published proof was wrong. Our Lemma 4 both fixes and improves that result.
Further related work. Other approaches to the analysis of the CBC MAC and the encrypted CBC MAC include those of Maurer [13] and Vaudenay [17] , but they only obtain bounds of m 2 q 2 /2 n .
Definitions
Notation. The empty string is denoted ε. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length. We let B n = {0, 1} n . If x ∈ B * n then |x| n = |x|/n denotes the number of n-bit blocks in it. If X ⊆ {0, 1}
* then X ≤m denotes the set of all non-empty strings formed by concatenating m or fewer strings from X and X + denotes the set of all strings formed by concatenating one or more strings from X. If M ∈ B * n then M i denotes its i-th n-bit block and M i→j denotes the string
If S is a set equipped with some probability distribution then s $ ← S denotes the operation of picking s from S according to this distribution. If no distribution is explicitly specified, it is understood to be uniform.
We denote by Perm(n) the set of all permutations over {0, 1} n , and by Func(n) the set of all functions mapping {0, 1}
* to {0, 1} n . (Both these sets are viewed as equipped with the uniform distribution.) A blockcipher E (with blocklength n and key-space K) is identified with the set of permutations {E K : K ∈ K} where E K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n denotes the map specified by key K ∈ K. The distribution is that induced by a random choice of
Security. An adversary is a randomized algorithm that always halts. Let A atk q,n,m denote the class of adversaries that make at most q oracle queries, where if atk = eq, then each query is in B m n ; if atk = pf, then each query is in B ≤m n and no query is a prefix of another; and if atk = any then each query is in B ≤m n . We remark that the adversaries considered here are computationally unbounded. In this paper we always consider deterministic, stateless oracles and thus we will assume that an adversary never repeats an oracle query. We also assume that an adversary never asks a query outside of the implicitly understood domain of interest.
Let F : D → {0, 1} n be a set of functions and let A ∈ A atk q,n,m be an adversary, where atk ∈ {eq, pf, any}. By "A f ⇒1" we denote the event that A outputs 1 with oracle f . The advantage of A (in distinguishing an instance of F from a random function outputting n bits) and the advantage of F are defined, respectively, as
Cbc and Ecbc. Fix n ≥ 1. For M ∈ B m n and π: B n → B n then define CBC
where m = |M | n . We let CBC = {CBC π : π ∈ Perm(n)}. This set of functions has the distribution induced by picking π uniformly from Perm(n).
To functions π 1 , π 2 : B n → B n we associate the encrypted CBC MAC function ECBC π1,π2 :
n . We let ECBC = {ECBC π1,π2 : π 1 , π 2 ∈ Perm(n)}. This set of functions has the distribution induced by picking π 1 , π 2 independently and uniformly at random from Perm(n).
n and atk ∈ {eq, pf, any} we then let
(the full collision probability) be the probability, over π
For atk ∈ {eq, pf, any} we then let
Results on the CBC MAC
We state results only for the atk = pf case; results for atk = eq follow due to (1) . To bound Adv pf CBC (q, n, m) we must consider a dynamic adversary that adaptively queries its oracle. Our first lemma reduces this problem to that of bounding a more "static" quantity whose definition does not involve an adversary, namely the full collision probability of the CBC MAC. The proof is in Section 5.
The next lemma bounds the full collision probability of the CBC MAC. The proof is given in Section 8.
Combining the above two lemmas we bound Adv pf CBC (q, n, m):
Results on the Encrypted CBC MAC
Following [7] , we view ECBC as an instance of the Carter-Wegman paradigm [18] . This enables us to reduce the problem of bounding Adv atk ECBC (q, n, m) to bounding the collision probability of the CBC MAC, as stated in the next lemma. A proof of the following is provided in [3] .
Lemma 3. For any n, m, q ≥ 1 and any atk ∈ {eq, pf, any},
Petrank and Rackoff [15] show that
Dodis et al. [9] show that CP eq n,m ≤ 2 −n + cm 2 · 2 −2n + cm 6 · 2 −3n for some absolute constant c. Combining this with Lemma 3 leads to
However, the case of atk = eq is not interesting here, since the point of ECBC is to gain security even for atk = any. To obtain an improvement for this, we show the following, whose proof is in Section 7: 
Bounding FCP Bounds CBC (Proof of Lemma 1)
The proof is by the game-playing technique [2, 4] . Let A be an adversary that asks exactlyueries, M 1 , . . . , M q ∈ B ≤m n , where no queries M r and M s , for r = s, share a prefix in B + n . We must show that Adv CBC (A) ≤ q 2 ·FCP pf n,m +4mq 2 /2 n . Refer to games D0-D7 as defined in Fig. 2 . Sets Dom(π) and Ran(π) start off as empty and automatically grow as points are added to the domain and range of the partial function π. Sets Dom(π) and Ran(π) are the complements of these sets relative to {0, 1} n . They automatically shrink as points join the domain and range of π. We write boolean values as 0 (false) and 1 (true), and we sometimes write then as a colon. The flag bad is initialized to 0 and the map π is initialized as everywhere undefined. We now briefly explain the sequence. 
. Now games D1 and D0 have been defined so as to be syntactically identical except on statements that immediately follow the setting of bad to true or the checking if bad is true, so the fundamental lemma of game-playing [4] at line 310, bounding the probability that bad gets set due to any of these three tests. To bound the probability of bad getting set at line 306: A total of at most mq times we select at line 305 a random sample C i s from a set of size at least 2 n − mq ≥ 2 n−1 . (We may assume that mq ≤ 2 n−1 since the probability bound given by our lemma exceeds 1 if mq > 2 n−1 .) The chance that one of these points is equal to any of the at most q points C mr r is thus at most 2mq 2 /2 n . To bound the probability of bad getting set by the C ms s ∈ Ran(π) test at line 309: easily seen to be at most mq 2 /2 n . To bound the probability of bad getting set by the C returned to the adversary in response to a query in game D4 is never referred to again in the code and has no influence on the game and the setting of bad . Accordingly, we may think of these values as being chosen up-front by the adversary who, correspondingly, makes an optimal choice of message queries M 1 , . . . , M q so as to maximize the probability that bad gets set in game D4. Queries M 1 , . . . , M q ∈ B ≤m n are prefix-free (meaning that no two strings from this list share a prefix P ∈ B + n ) and the strings have block lengths of m 1 , . . . , m q , respectively, where each m i ≤ m. We fix such an optimal vector of messages and message lengths in passing to game D5, so that Pr[A D4 sets bad ] ≤ Pr[D5 sets bad ]. The adversary has effectively been eliminated at this point.
D5→D6: Next we postpone the evaluation of bad and undo the "lazy defining" of π to arrive at game D6. We have Pr[D5 sets bad ] ≤ Pr[D6 sets bad ]. D6→D7: Next we observe that in game D6, some pair r, s must contribute at least an average amount to the probability that bad gets set. Namely, for any r, s ∈ [ 
A Graph-Based Representation of CBC
In this section we describe a graph-based view of CBC computations and provide some lemmas that will then allow us to reduce the problem of upper bounding the collision probabilities CP any n,m and FCP pf n,m to combinatorial counting problems. We fix for the rest of this section a blocklength n ≥ 1 and a pair of distinct messages associated to M1, M2 and a permutation π ∈ Perm(n). The next associates to G ∈ G(M1, M2) its type-1, type-2 and type-3 collision profiles. The last algorithm constructs a graph from its type-2 collision profile A ∈ Prof2(M1, M2).
Structure graphs. To M 1 , M 2 and any π ∈ Perm(n) we associate the structure graph G 
: π ∈ Perm(n)} denote the set of all structure graphs associated to messages M 1 , M 2 . This set has the probability distribution induced by picking π at random from Perm(n).
We associate to 
, where σ(·) is the vertex-labeling function defined by Perm2Graph(π). We emphasize that V i b depends on G (and thus implicitly on M 1 and M 2 ), and if we want to make the dependence explicit we will write V i b (G). Collisions. We use the following notation for sequences. If s = (s 1 , . . . , s k ) is a sequence then |s| = k; y ∈ s iff y = s i for some i ∈ [1..k]; s x = (s 1 , . . . , s k , x); and ( ) denotes the empty sequence. For G = (V, E) ∈ G, E ⊆ E, V ⊆ V and a, b ∈ V we define Cycle G (V , E , a, b) = 1 if adding edge (a, b) to graph G = (V , E ) closes a cycle of length at least four with directions of edges on the cycle alternating. Formally, Cycle G (V , E , a, b) = 1 iff there exists k ≥ 2 and vertices
, and (b, a) ∈ E. To a graph G ∈ G we associate sequences Prof 1 (G), Prof 2 (G), Prof 3 (G) called, respectively, the type-1, type-2 and type-3 collision profiles of G. They are returned by the algorithm Graph2Profs (graph to collision profiles) of Fig. 3 that refers to the predicate Cycle G we have just defined. We say that G has a type-a (i, t)-collision (a ∈ {1, 2, 3}) if (i, t) ∈ Prof a (G). Type-3 collisions are also called accidents, and type-1 collisions that are not accidents are called induced collisions. We let col i (G) = |Prof i (G)| for i = 1, 2, 3.
The lemma builds on an unpublished technique from [8, 9] . A proof is given in [3] .
.a]. Algorithm Prof2Graph (collision profile to graph) of Fig. 3 associates to A ∈ Prof 2 (M 1 , M 2 ) a graph in a natural way. We leave the reader to verify the following:
This means that the type-2 collision profile of a graph determines it uniquely. Now for i = 1, 2, 3 and an integer a ≥ 0 we let
n , = max(m 1 , m 2 ), and assume 2 ≤ 2 n−2 . Then
Proof. By Lemma 5
Since every type-3 collision is a type-2 collision, |G
, and observe that the assumption 2 ≤ 2 n−2 made in the lemma statement implies that x ≤ 1/2. Thus the above is
where the last inequality used the fact that ≤ 2 n−2 .
Let P denote a predicate on graphs. Then φ M1,M2
[P ] will denote the set of all
(That is, it is the set of structure graphs G having exactly one type-3 collision and satisfying the predicate.) For example, predicate P might be V m1
Note that if G has exactly one accident then Prof 2 (G) = Prof 3 (G), meaning the accident was both a type-2 and a type-3 collision. We will use this below. In this case when we talk of an (i, t)-accident, we mean a type-2 (i, t)-collision.
Finally, let in G (v) denote the in-degree of a vertex v in a structure graph G. 
Proof. With the probability over G $ ← G(M 1 , M 2 ), we have:
In (4) above we used that Pr [
with M 1 = M 2 implies that there is at least one accident. In (5) we first used Lemma 5, and then used Lemma 7. In (6) we used the fact that ≤ 2 n−2 , which follows from the assumption 2 ≤ 2 n−2 .
Next we bound the size of the set that arises above:
and M 2 ∈ B m2 n be distinct messages. Then
Putting together Lemmas 8 and 9 completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof (Lemma 9). Let k ≥ 0 be the largest integer such that M 1 , M 2 have a common suffix of k blocks. Note that
. Thus, we may consider M 1 to be replaced by M 
(This is also a type-3 (V m2 1 (G), t)-collision since G has exactly one accident.) To see this note that since there was at most one accident, we have in G (V 
Proof. Use an argument similar to that of Lemma 10, noting and there is only one accident, the only possibility is that this is a (V In this section we show that FCP pf n, ≤ 8 /2 n + 8 4 /2 2n for any n, with 2 ≤ 2 n−2 , thereby proving Lemma 2. Recall that pf(M 1 , M 2 ) = false iff M 1 is not a prefix of M 2 and M 2 is not a prefix of M 1 . The proof of the following is similar to the proof of Lemma 8 and is omitted. 
